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Chapter One: Historical Background	  
Approach	  
In this thesis, I will examine the dynamics of power between the Athenian 
assembly and the three generals assigned to positions of command in the Sicilian 
Expedition – Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus – and attempt to contextualize 
Alcibiades’ defecting from Athens to Sparta. I focus on the Sicilian Expedition narrative 
in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War Books 6 and 7, but also use Plutarch’s 
Life of Alcibiades and Life of Nicias, plus the Life of Coriolanus.	  
In the first chapter, after discussing the sources, I examine the personal history of 
the commanders involved (the Athenians Alcibiades, Lamachus, and Nicias, and the 
Spartan Gylippus). In my second chapter, I then turn to the governmental structures and 
military customs of Athens, Sparta, and Sicily, zeroing in on the Athenian Assembly and 
its military role. In the third chapter, I briefly analyze several short speeches by Nicias 
and Alcibiades to the Athenian Assembly in Thucydides Books 6 and 7, and compare 
Thucydides with Plutarch’s Life of Alcibiades and Life of Nicias.Throughout, I 
concentrate on the communication between the Athenian generals and their Assembly, 
and compare this relationship to the one between the Spartan generals and their assembly 
(as well as the Syracusan commanders' dealings with the Syracusan assembly). I analyze 
the difficulties that Nicias faced in trying to lead the Sicilian expedition, and the 
differences between his approach from that of Gylippus – and the differing results.  
In a brief fourth chapter, I argue that the Athenian assembly ruined its leadership 
through excessive interference, whereas Sparta allowed relative autonomy to generals, 




	   	   	  
	  
and Syracusan commanders had flexible, realistic relations with that city’s assembly. I 
will conclude that argue that Alcibiades was justified in defecting to Sparta because of 
the flawed system in which he was forced to operate at Athens, a city that did not 
appreciate his talents and skills.1 In a short appendix, I include a chronology of the 
Sicilian expedition to assist the reader in placing these events in context.	  
	  
Ancient Sources 	  
Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War will be the primary source for my 
analysis.2 Thucydides, who lived in fifth-century Athens, and who served in the Athenian 
armed forces, provides a contemporary account of the conflict. His History is essential 
for background as well as for four long speeches to the Athenian Assembly.	  
However, since Thucydides was in exile, his narrations of these four speeches would 
have been based on rumor, on transcripts – if they existed – or on what he thought the 
speakers would have, or should have, said.  So, as Thucydides himself says in 1.21 and 
1.22, he takes liberties with many speeches:	  
With reference to the speeches in this history, some were delivered before the war 
began, others while it was going on; some I heard myself, others I got from 
various quarters; it was in all cases difficult to carry them word for word in one’s 
memory, so my habit has been to make the speakers say what was in my opinion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A different view of Athenian democracy and the war: Hanson (2010) 86, speaking of lessons, but not 
	  
2 Cited from Crawley’s revised translation (1996).	  
	  




	   	   	  
	  
demanded of them by the various occasions, of course adhering as closely as 
possible to the general sense of what they really said.  
Thucydides also speaks of liberties taken with his narrative: 
And with reference to the narrative of events, far from permitting myself to derive 
it from the first source that came to hand, I did not even trust my own 
impressions, but it rests partly on what I saw myself, partly on what others saw 
for me, the accuracy of the report being always tried by the most severe and 
detailed tests possible.3	  
As K. J. Dover observes, “Thucydides used his imagination only when memory or 
information was inadequate, never to replace, let alone contradict, what he had reason to 
think the speaker had actually said.”4 In the main, the speeches are trustworthy. The same 
is true of the narrative. 	   In his analysis of Thucydides’ potential sources for the 
conference between the Athenian generals in Sicily, Dover argues that Alcibiades himself 
may have served as Thucydides’ informant.5 	  
The only other narrative of the war, by Diodorus Siculus, mostly derives from 
Thucydides. Xenophon’s account, in the first book of his History of Greece, begins after 
the Sicilian expedition. In Thucydides, the narrative of the Sicilian expedition follows the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Thucydides 1.21-2.	  
	  
4 Dover (1973) 21.	  
	  
5 Thucydides 6.46.5-50.1; Thucydides 7.46-9.	  
	  




	   	   	  
	  
description of the Peace of Nicias – the fragile armistice signed in 422 BCE – and 
subsequent skirmishes in the early 410s BCE.6	  
Plutarch's Life of Alcibiades provides a biographical sketch of the central figure in 
my thesis. Secondary scholarship will provide a critical analysis of Plutarch, who lived 
from 50 AD – 120 AD, and was far removed from the events and figures he writes about 
in his Parallel Lives.  Plutarch also has extra-historical, literary aims noticed by scholars 
such as Marco Gygax.7 Plutarch’s Life of Nicias and Life of Pericles provide background 
on the lives and military experience of the other military commanders, Nicias and 
Gylippus, and afford a contrast between Alcibiades’ personality and traits, and those of 
these two less exceptional figures. The Life of Coriolanus, the match for Alcibiades 
among Plutarch’s Roman Lives, is, unsurprisingly, relevant for Plutarch’s attitude 
towards Alcibiades. Plutarch paired these two men partly because of shared difficulties in 
dealing with popular assemblies – but perhaps sacrifices accuracy for the sake of a 
compelling comparison.	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See Lendon (2010) for an analysis of the Archidamian War and chronology of events prior to the Peace of 
Nicias. See Hanson (2010) for background on the Persian Wars and the Periclean era – including Pericles’ 
defensive strategy against Sparta.	  
	  
7 Gygax (2006) 484.	  
	  




	   	   	  
	  
The Athenian Commanders	  
            Although the Athenian commanders came from similar backgrounds of wealth 
and prestige, they differed in their political outlooks and strategic preferences, their 
approaches to the war, and their communication with the Athenian Assembly.	  
	  
Alcibiades	  
After the death of Pericles, the leading statesman in Athens, Alcibiades had 
overshadowed Cleon and Nicias and assumed a leading position in the city. Like Pericles, 
Alcibiades was an aristocrat with a record of military successes. In fact, Alcibiades was 
raised by Pericles and Ariphron after the death of his parents.8 However, Alcibiades 
carved out his own charismatic political style. Alcibiades roused the Assembly to action, 
whereas Pericles embodied a thoughtful, prudent, middle-aged leader. Alcibiades’ 
willingness to take chances meant that his policy was expansionist, not conservative, and 
he was willing to send large naval and land forces to distant objectives. 	  
Alcibiades’ oratorical skill, which he may have learned partly from Pericles, was 
crucial to his rise to prominence in the Athenian Assembly, and his prominence allowed 
him to convince the Assembly to approve the expedition, and eventually grant him co-
command. However, his reputation for poor ethics polarized his compatriots into two 
groups, supporters and opponents.9 His opposition to the Peace of Nicias did not help his 
popularity.10	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Plutarch, Life of Alcibiades 1.	  
	  
9 Alcibiades was also famed as a bon vivant, which led the Athenian people to worry about his ethical 
standards and behavior (Plutarch, Life of Alcibiades 7).	  




	   	   	  
	  
Alcibiades’ being charged with impiety in the affair of the Herms effectively 
removed him from a position of influence and authority in Athens (and would give him 
reason to flee Athenian jurisdiction later in the expedition).  Yet the charge against him 
was politically motivated, and was never substantiated.11 If he could be accused of poor 
ethics, his opponents could be accused of the more serious crime of manipulating the 
legal system and the Athenians’ superstitious religious fears. 	  
The philosopher Socrates shaped Alcibiades’ personality insofar as Alcibiades, 
like Socrates, questioned conventional views and conduct. 12  This atypical approach was 
one reason for Alcibiades’ exceptional success, both politically and militarily.13 It also 
was a reason for his habit of switching allegiances among the Athenians, Spartans, and 
Persians. He was repeatedly in positions of authority, but unable, or unwilling, to 
maintain any position for long.14 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
10 Plutarch, Life of Nicias 10.	  
	  
11 Plutarch, Life of Alcibiades 19.	  
	  
12 Alcibiades had been involved in a homoerotic relationship with Socrates in his youth, and had been his 
tent mate at the battle of Potidaea.	  
	  
13 An anecdote: Alcibiades cut off the tail of an expensive dog just for the sake of doing it (Plutarch, Life of 
Alcibiades 9).	  
	  
14 Note that Plutarch’s Life of Alcibiades portrays Alcibiades in an overall positive light, but the Life of 
Nicias furnishes negative qualities and episodes for Alcibiades. This should caution the reader against 
taking a undiscerning view of Plutarch’s narratives, because of his tendency to present the main character 
in each of his narratives in a positive regard.	  
	  




	   	   	  
	  
Plutarch’s more favorable narrative presents Alcibiades as so influential and 
authoritative that it seems that if Alcibiades had remained in command during the entire 
expedition, the expedition would have succeeded.	  
	  
Nicias	  
            Nicias was more like Pericles than Alcibiades was, but lacked Pericles’ influence. 
Nicias did not have Pericles' depth of character, Plutarch says, but compensated through 
use of his wealth.15 Plutarch also says that Nicias' faint-heartedness reassured the 
Athenian assembly, which thought this trait appropriate in well-born public servants of 
the democracy.  Yet there was more to Nicias than this pliability. Plutarch portrays Nicias 
as possessing a "lofty" personality, which, combined with his prudence, made him a 
natural leader.16 Consumed with affairs of war, Nicias had been successful militarily. 	  
After Pericles’ death, Nicias had established himself as the demagogue Cleon’s 
primary rival. Prominent Athenians wanted to establish him as an "antidote" to Cleon – 
and helped Nicias achieve his personal goals as well.17 Later, he was the main architect of 
the Peace of Nicias, which brought the first phase of the Peloponnesian War to an end. 	  
Nicias' influence diminished in the course of the Sicilian expedition. First 
Alcibiades overshadowed him, and later the arrival of Demosthenes frustrated his plans. 
Demosthenes, not Nicias, won the support of the Athenian troops, who had witnessed 
Nicias' shortcomings during the campaign, especially after Alcibiades left. 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Plutarch, Life of Nicias 3.	  
	  
16 Ibid., 5.	  
	  
17 Ibid., 2.	  




	   	   	  
	  
Thus, the multiplicity of command, plus changes in commanders, hampered 
Nicias, and made it difficult for him to pursue the continuous and prudent path of 
leadership that he preferred.18 A political system that was eventually hostile to Alcibiades 
also undermined this very different leader. 	  
	  
Lamachus 	  
The third commander, the less important Lamachus, illustrated the Athenians’ 
preference that command be shared. Lamachus was daring in battle – a characteristic he 
shared with Alcibiades – but he was inferior to Alcibiades because of his lack of 
influence, while he was inferior to Nicias because of Nicias’ greater dignity and 
reputation, and also because of Nicias’ greater wealth.  Since, as Deborah Hamel notes, 
the handling of Athenian forces was determined by majority vote of the commanders, 
Lamachus’ support of Alcibiades was another obstacle for Nicias. Late in the campaign, 
after Alcibiades’ departure, Lamachus’ death in single combat with a Syracusan 
cavalryman left Nicias in sole command, until the Athenians could send additional 
generals to assist Nicias.19 In Plutarch’s opinion, however, this turn of events was not 
decisive for the outcome of the war. In death as in life, Lamachus was not able to free 
two bigger men, Alcibiades and Nicias, from the politically generated troubles that beset 
them.  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For a further negative example of multiplicity of Athenian command within the context of the Sicilian 
expedition, see Thucydides 7.48-49.	  
	  
19 Plutarch, Life of Nicias 18.	  
	  




	   	   	  
	  
The Spartan Commanders	  
Gylippus	  
Gylippus was a member of the Spartan elite. His father Cleandridas served as an 
ephor and advised the Spartan king Pleistoanax.20 Although his mother may have been of 
non-Spartan origin – and Gylippus thus would have been considered a half-Spartan, or 
mothax – this did not prevent him from becoming a leading Spartan officer.  In Syracuse, 
Gylippus’ assignment was to guide the Syracusans and to command their forces. This 
required diplomatic skills as well as military aptitude. Just as Alcibiades and Nicias had 
to deal with the Athenian assembly, Gylippus had to deal with the assembly and also the 
military leaders of Syracuse.	  Although Gylippus had more authority than he would have 
if he had been a local official, he was still forced to rely on Syracuse for men, materiel, 
and ships. He did not worry about the authorities in Sparta.	  
            All in all, the biographical element in the military situation was an important one, 
for it helps to explain the dynamics under which each commander, and his forces, 
operated. Although each commander had his own political assets and problems, 
Alcibiades had the most complex background and personality, the most significant 
relations with an assembly, and the most either to gain or lose. Gylippus was the 
opposite: a talented, but not flashy, leader with full authority, a diplomat, not an intriguer.	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Plutarch, Life of Pericles 22; Thucydides 6.93, with Kennel (2011) 118.	  
	  




	   	   	  
	  
	  
Chapter Two: Background on Governmental and Military Customs	  
Athens	  
During the fifth century BC, Athens' military and political systems were 
integrated with one another. The Athenian assembly determined the city’s administrative 
policy, elected officials, and military policy.21 Although the Athenian court system 
checked the power of the Assembly, the δῆµος – the Athenian citizen body – was the 
ultimate source of both the courts and the Assembly.  If religious factors are put aside, 
there existed no code of laws that safeguarded Athenians from the consequences of 
majoritarianism. As long as Pericles was alive, some of these consequences were 
forestalled. After his death during the plague in 429 BC, jockeying for power among 
Cleon, Nicias, and others revealed the worst effects of this constitutional weakness. 	  
Although the Athenian assembly ostensibly granted Nicias, Alcibiades, and 
Lamachus “full and independent powers” in administering the conflict in Sicily, actual 
Athenian military administration was very different from what this phrase implies.22 The 
Athenian top military (and diplomatic) leadership consisted of ten annually elected 
στρατηγοί, or generals/admirals.23  Besides electing them, the Assembly obliged them to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Although the Athenian assembly was an unusually democratic body by the standards of antiquity, it was 
highly restrictive by today’s standards, for only citizen males that had reached the age of thirty were 
allowed to participate. The issue for military administration is thus not the egalitarian composition of the 
assembly, but the lack of checks on its power, and its lack of military knowledge.	  
	  
22 Plutarch, Life of Alcibiades 14.	  
	  
23 The concept of ten generals sharing command, as well as the term limits of the στρατηγοί, was designed 
to prevent one person from gathering too much power and establishing himself as a tyrant over the city, as 
Pisistratus had done. Many Greek tyrants began as generals, but this problem, although a part of Athenian 
history, never was part of the history of Sparta.	  
	  




	   	   	  
	  
consult it before making any important decisions, such as peace treaties, the disposition 
of prisoners, and the implementation of military strategy, even as it provided perplexing 
instructions in matters large and small. As Hamel says, the Assembly liked “broad 
definitions of objectives” that could confuse commanders, yet also controlled minutiae, 
like the exact number of troops and ships.24 	  
Furthermore, Athenian generals were forced to undergo evaluations (εὐθῦναι) at 
the end of their terms, another factor that discouraged making unpopular but essential 
decisions. Worst of all, the generals were subject to possible prosecution by two 
altogether different parties. First, the assembly could prosecute them for crimes 
uncovered, or alleged, during εὐθῦναι. Some of these crimes amounted to accusations 
that the general had been guilty of being defeated, even in circumstances in which defeat 
was unavoidable. Furthermore, as Hamel notes, a general could also be prosecuted at his 
deposition from office.25 Second, members of the forces which they commanded could 
prosecute them. In 406 BC, trial of the Arginusae generals would provide a notorious 
example, as captains of vessels accused generals serving as admirals of the Athenian 
fleet. The admirals had won the battle, but the prosecutions took place nevertheless, and 
the resulting convictions decimated Athens’ top leadership. In the course of the fifth and 
fourth centuries the number of Athenian generals put on trial was remarkably high.	  
For the period of the Peloponnesian War – for which Hamel says that we have 
data for between 64 and 67 percent of the generals – between 10.7 and 11.8 percent of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Hamel (1998) 115-116.	  
	  
25 Hamel (1998) 130.	  
	  




	   	   	  
	  
these commanders were prosecuted.26 Hamel notes that in practical terms, this was 
roughly equivalent to one prosecution per year.27 Furthermore, prosecutions often ended 
with disciplinary action. Hamel notes that for 20 of the 22 trials for which evidence exists 
between 431/0 and 405/4, as many as 19 ended in conviction – and in fourteen of these 
cases, the commander was sentenced to death, and nine were actually executed.28 	  
Athenian generals could retaliate, and punish their subordinates, but usually after 
the fact, in Athens. Their powers to discipline subordinates in the field were limited.	  
As Hamel summarizes, “However far generals marched their troops from the 
borders of Attica, they did not leave Athens’ pnyx far behind.”29 Furthermore, military 
commanders could be accused years after the time of their command as well, which could 
affect their political career with uncertainty for the rest of their lives.30 Nicias especially 
would take this knowledge with him to Sicily. Alcibiades would take it with him to 
Sparta, when he took refuge there after quitting the expedition.31 	  
	  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




28 Hamel (1998) 133. However, as she notes, ancient speechwriters were often motivated politically to 
refer to speeches in which severe penalties were awarded, thus providing the possibility for distortion in our 
analysis of the data.	  
	  
29	  Hamel	  (1998)	  133.	  	  	  
	  
30	  Conon	  prosecuted	  Adeimantos	  twelve	  years	  after	  his	  στρατηγία	  of	  405/4	  BC;	  see	  Hamel	  (1998)	  
130.	  Thus,	  there	  was	  not	  a	  fixed	  interval	  after	  which	  a	  general	  could	  be	  free	  from	  prosecution.	  
	  
31 Another critical view of the Athenian system: Hansen 345.	  
	  




	   	   	  
	  
Sparta	  
Sparta’s government and political structure were intermeshed also. Sparta’s kings 
were responsible for leading the army into battle. Although one king would remain in 
Sparta to administer the government while the other campaigned, the kings switched 
roles regularly to allow both men experience in each sphere. Over the course of their 
reigns, the kings would be able to amass much more command experience than the 
Athenians were able to, since Athenian generals were often forced to relinquish military 
command after a year.32 A similar contrast applied to Spartan officers. Either the kings 
appointed them for long-term service, or the assembly elected them, but if it did elect 
them, it was less fickle, and less politically inclined, than the assembly in Athens. As a 
result, men like Gylippus or Brasidas compiled military resumes with longer, steadier, 
and more diverse experience than their Athenian counterparts.	  
Next, the Spartan assembly did not subject kings or other officers to anything like 
Athenian assembly instructions. They did not interfere as much, and they did not subject 
officers to end-of-term εὐθῦναι. Instead, ephors accompanied the kings on campaigns. 
Because of this supervision, Spartan kings seldom took actions that would lead to their 
being tried, and they never were tried simply for the crime of being defeated. (On the 
contrary, they would sometimes be tried for failing to risk battle.33 ) If kings were tried at 
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all, the court was not the assembly, or some similar large panel, but the γερουσία, a 
council of elders that must have included many experienced military officers.34 	  
Another difference between the two societies was not institutional, but cultural. 
The Spartans’ unusual customs, traced to the legendary Lycurgus, encouraged a military 
ethos. The community had a firm religious and ancestral basis for their tradition of 
prioritizing warfare and military training. This tradition, in turn, affected the conduct and 
attitude of military officers. They sensed that the community was behind them—the 
kings, the γερουσία, the assembly. If they served with foreign troops, as Gylippus and 
Brasidas did, they brought their self-confidence with them, and used it to inspire others. 
Whereas an Athenian officer often found himself at odds with his own government, a 
Spartan officer found himself supported at home and admired abroad. 	  
Trained, esteemed, protected, the Spartan officers had esprit de corps. Among the 
Athenian military, no such feeling could exist. Instead an exceptional leader like 
Alcibiades could build a reputation that reflected his personality, his family prestige, and 
his philosophical education. He was a unique Athenian. Gylippus, who had an unusual 
career, was a typically effective Spartan officer. 	  
Spartan society was very law-abiding. Even the two kings were held responsible 
for obeying the Spartan constitution by the five ephors. These magistrates also were 
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charged with the maintenance and oversight of public morals.35 Athens was law-abiding, 
but it was also litigious. The difference in ethos was important for military leaders. 
Spartan attitudes contributed to the authority that officers possessed. In Athens, public 




Early Sicilian government included  many tyrants.36 Although Diodorus’ narrative 
regarding the transition from tyranny to democracy in Sicily is unreliable, it is generally 
accepted that tyranny fell into disuse with the expulsion of Thrasybulus from Syracuse.37 
(For maps of Sicily and the Greek world, see p. 24)	  
The next kind of government, democracy, was relatively new, so citizens would 
not have been well-versed in the positive and negative aspects of organs of democratic 
government, such as assemblies. As Finley notes, democratic experience prior to the 
Peloponnesian War were “very limited and unpromising.”38 However, democracy in 
Syracuse differed from the Athenian version in that the council and civil officials, instead 
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of being chosen by lot, were elected.39 This put a limit on full democracy, and would 
eventually allow skilled personnel to administer the state.	  
Sicily’s involvement with Athens originated in the 450s BCE when Segesta 
signed a treaty with Athens, followed by similar treaties between Leontini and Athens, 
and likewise between Rhegium and Athens.40 Athens’ involvement in Sicily continued 
with the renewal of its treaties with Rhegium and Leontini in 433 BCE. Athens’ military 
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Chapter Three: The Sicilian Expedition	  
Thucydides’ Perspective as an Athenian	  
Thucydides’ exile allowed him to witness some conflicts firsthand, but also to 
learn of important speeches by envoys and others on the Spartan side, and he thus gained  
some understanding of Spartan as opposed to Athenian war making. For him, the Sicilian 
expedition illustrated certain Athenian weaknesses, especially weaknesses of the 
Athenian assembly in its relations with commanders.  Plutarch, who has different 
interests, does not contradict Thucydides on this point.	  
	  
Athens: The conflict between the generals and the Assembly42	  
  The conflict between the generals and the assembly emerges in several speeches 
in Book 6 of Thucydides. On one side stands Nicias, trying to restrain the Assembly. On 
the other stands Alcibiades, trying to spur them on. Who will the Assembly listen to, and 
why?	  
Nicias’ first speech, which warns against any Sicilian expedition, demonstrates 
prudence and practicality:43	  
I affirm, then, that you leave many enemies behind you here to go there far away 
and bring more back with you. You imagine, perhaps, that the treaty which you 
have made can be trusted; a treaty that will continue to exist nominally, as long as 
you keep quiet – for nominal it has become, owing to the practices of certain men 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Hammond (1986) 387-400 provides a description of the Sicilian expedition and an analysis of the 
speeches and political factions present at the debate regarding the expedition.	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here and at Sparta…Again, some of the most powerful states have never yet 
accepted the arrangement at all. Some of these are at open war with us; others (as 
the Spartans do not yet move) are restrained by truces renewed every ten days, 
and it is only too probable that if they found our power divided, as we are 
hurrying to divide it, they would attack us vigorously….44 
Nicias also raises the possibility that even if the Sicilians were conquered, it 
would be difficult to dominate them. Failure, he adds, would result in worse 
consequences than not pursuing the expedition at all. To military arguments he adds 
diplomatic ones – a natural switch, since Athenian generals doubled as diplomats. Cities 
including Thebes, Megara, and Elis would possibly turn against Athens once the city 
becomes distracted by a conflict far away).  He concludes by arguing that the Athenians 
should solidify their control over existing cities before attempting to conquer more. He is 
a cautious imperialist.	  
If no one else, the older men in the Assembly ought to accept these arguments. 
When they do not, the initiative shifts to Alcibiades, who argues for the expedition by 
appealing to Athenian love of glory, power, and wealth – and the Athenians’ duty to 
assist their allies.45 This speech demonstrates the effect of Alcibiades’ charisma on an 
audience composed mainly of civilians who lack familiarity with strategic issues raised 
by Nicias. That is dangerous enough, but more dangerous is Alcibiades’ raising 
expectations in the Assembly for the successes achievable by the Athenian forces. The 
eventual disappointment of these expectations will contribute to the harsh treatment of 
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the generals by the Assembly.  The Athenians are harming themselves not only in 
recklessly pursuing the expedition, but also in setting in motion a conflict between the 
people and their generals. 	  
At Thucydides 6.16 and following, Alcibiades speaks and succeeds in deluding 
the Athenians:	  
The cities in Sicily are peopled by motley rabbles, and easily change their 
institutions and adopt new ones in their stead; and consequently the inhabitants, 
being without any feeling of patriotism, are not provided with arms for their 
persons, and have not regularly established themselves on the land; every man 
thinks that either by fair words or by party strife he can obtain something at the 
public expense, and then in the event of a catastrophe settle in some other country, 
and makes his preparations accordingly. From a mob like this you need not look 
for either unanimity in counsel or unity in action.46	  
Alcibiades deals with Nicias’ diplomatic arguments by attempting to shame the 
Assembly into action. What would Athens say to its allies, he asks? He also 
misrepresents the diplomatic situation in Sicily by claiming that the Sicilians are too 
unstable to maintain any anti-Athenian alliances. Again countering Nicias, he claims that 
Athens' power will increase as a result of the expedition, rather than decrease. 	  
This onslaught, although appealing to several Athenian weaknesses or 
propensities, is not enough to win the debate, and so Alcibiades co-opts the criticisms 
made by Nicias by proposing that Nicias and himself be granted the joint command. At 
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this juncture, a crucial feature of the Athenian system, sharing of command among 
generals, enters into the Assembly’s deliberations. Joint command could lead to 
confusion and later recriminations, yet Alcibiades presents it as a way for the Assembly 
to be bold and cautious at the same time. The ploy is shrewd, but the effect could be 
disastrous.  	  
Trapped, Nicias can do no better than accede to the Assembly’s request that he 
increase the expedition’s chance of success by making specific recommendations.47 His 
only remaining tactic is make recommendations that reflect the full reality of the 
difficulties that will face the expedition, and to hope that this exposition will lead the 
Assembly to reconsider. Since Athens’ Sicilian opponents are very powerful – with 
triremes, hoplites, archers, and dart-throwers, and especially cavalry – Nicias 
recommends raising a large land army. He appeals to the Athenians’ sense of pride in 
making this request, and argues that he would not want them to suffer humiliation, or be 
“shut out from the country” of Sicily. Like Alcibiades, he panders to the Assembly’s love 
of glory. At the same time, he implies that Athens, a sea power, is about to start a land 
war that it will not be able to carry through.	  
Nevertheless, young and old persist in desiring the expedition. The attempt to beat 
Alcibiades at his own game has failed. The prolonged struggle between Alcibiades and 
Nicias leads one more mistake by the Assembly, when they add a third commander to the 
expedition, Lamachus, who is expected to serve as a unifying figure, but is too weak and 
inexperienced for the task.  They did have to make this mistake, as shown by IG i3 98, 
lines1-5, which show that at some point they wished to send  just one commander.	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The inability of the Athenians to gather and assess military and diplomatic 
intelligence about Sicily, to formulate a realistic strategy, and to appoint a unified 
command, all emerge from this opening episode in the Sicilian affair. The effect on 
Nicias must have been demoralizing. Yet the effect on Alcibiades must have been 
negative, too. He has to some degree fooled the Athenians, but he could not have more 
confidence in them for this reason. If, in the future, they turned against him with as little 
considerations as they had shown when turning in his favor, he might expect the same 
kind of unreasonable demands to be imposed on him as had already been imposed on 
Nicias.	  
Whether or not the affair of the herms ever took place, Alcibiades had already 
found a reason to defect, should the opportunity arise. When he does defect, later in Book 
Six, he will explain that one reason was the misconduct of the Assembly.48 A man of his 
brilliance and potential would not have want to risk ending to his political career thanks 
to a Sicilian defeat due to the ignorance of the δῆµος, even if he had exploited this 
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Sicily: The Consequences of Division and Confusion 	  
With Alcibiades now gone, Nicias showed how little suited he was to the task of 
commanding an expedition advocated by a man of altogether different gifts. His slow, 
cautious approach of circumnavigating Sicily was a characteristic mistake that allowed 
the enemy to get the better of the Athenian fleet.51 Nicias was not incompetent: Plutarch 
approves of Nicias’ sailing against Syracuse and his sending a Catanian messenger to 
trick the Syracusans into coming to Catana to set fire to the Athenian ships. This shrewd 
maneuver let Nicias bring the enemy out of its city. He was able to take control of the 
harbors and establish a defensible camp.52 Nicias’ trouble was that his tactical 
competence could not solve political problems besetting the expedition.	  
One problem that had arisen before, in Athens, and that now arose again, was the 
Assembly’s overconfidence, and its consequent refusal to take expert advice.  Nicias had 
said the Athenians would need a big land army, and now he said it again, in a letter to the 
Assembly that Thucydides describes early in Book 7.53 Nicias’ supporters must have 
been saying the same thing, but their pleas had done no good. Another problem now 
reappeared:  political infighting, as those who were opposed to Nicias delayed sending 
troops because they wanted him to be unsuccessful.  
At length, the Assembly heeded Nicias and sent more troops. However, the delay 
and disagreement had done some harm, for a new commander, Eurymedon, was sent with 
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only a small fleet. Athens decided not to send a large fleet, under Demosthenes, until the 
spring. Demosthenes, a successful general with no political baggage, would rank on a par 
with Nicias. This appointment showed the Assembly’s preference for multiple 
commanders. So did assigning two more commanders to the Sicilian Expedition, 
Euthydemus and Menander. The Athenians were more willing to send superfluous 
commanders than to send needed troops. 
In the meantime, Nicias and his men found themselves on the defense, unable to 
throw back Syracusans reinvigorated by local reforms and the Spartan Gylippus. 
Crucially, Gylippus captured the Athenian garrison at Plemmyrium. That improved the 
naval position of the defenders, and worsened the naval position of the Athenians. 
Athenian naval supremacy, which had been taken for granted so far, was now in peril. 
Demosthenes arrived, and carried out his own plans, which ended disastrously.   
This strategos nevertheless defended himself against accusations coming from 
Alcibiades. Even after Alcibiades’ defection, the squabbling among the generals 
continued.   
Nicias’ letter to the Athenian Assembly marked the culmination of his difficult 
relations with the Athenian Assembly. In the beginning, he had asked for more than they 
would give. In the end, he got too little too late. He had ended up leading an expedition 
he did not want, in partnership with a man, Alcibiades, whom he did not trust. Yet Nicias 
was not the only victim in the affair. Lamachus died for nothing. Even Alcibiades was a 
victim of a sort. Although he was the most skilled commander of the expedition, Athens 
recalled him because of unsubstantiated charges. Then Nicias, the wrong commander for 
this task, replaced him, and any early chances for success were squandered.  The failure 




	   	   	  
	  
of the Sicilian expedition left Athens with approximately only 10,000 hoplites and 100 
triremes.54  
In yet another way, the Athenian Assembly had victimized itself. First it was 
overly enthusiastic about the expedition. Then, during the affair of the herms, it panicked, 
perhaps because of unacknowledged fears about the outcome of the Sicilian enterprise. It 
poured men and ships into Sicily without a general plan, and lost them. When it sent 
Demosthenes to Sicily, it was throwing good money in after bad. Yet even then, as 
disaster for the expedition became more likely, the Assembly might have saved its 
generals and armies, and itself, by immediately giving Nicias all that he asked for. It 
failed to do so.  
Why? Partly political infighting, partly overconfidence. Mainly, the Assembly 
was too far removed from the conflict to be effectively concerned. That made it easier for 
political factions to sway the Assembly. That also made it easier to make the mistake of 
listening to Alcibiades in the first place, and then make the mistake of effectively 
dismissing him by threatening him with prosecution.    
In short, the Athenian generals were in a very difficult position. On the one hand, 
they were responsible for making the best and most prudent decision possible in spite of 
circumstances beyond their control, and on the other hand, they were obliged to appease 
the Assembly, which could take away their reputations and their lives. This balancing act 
was one that many Athenian commanders, even those who were brave and skilful, could 
not perform for long.  Pericles was able to, but later commanders were not. Alcibiades 
was better at deceiving the Assembly than at appeasing them. Nicias was better at 
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appeasing them than at performing his military duties. Cleon was a mix. He deceived or 
demagogued the Assembly, but was incompetent when put in the highest commands. 	  
Defecting to Sparta thus may have seemed very appealing to Alcibiades. This was 
one way to escape from an Athenian general’s predicament, and not to end up dead on 
the battlefield, as Demosthenes and Nicias would, or exiled after an unfair trial. If 
Alcibiades realized that, no matter what he or others did, the expedition would fail, and 
the Athenians would eventually be displeased, he may have felt he had no choice. 	  
	  
The Syracusan side of the war	  
The Syracusans began the war with 15 generals. The Assembly took an active part 
in the war. The results, as the Syracusan Hermocrates said, were unsatisfactory.55 The 
Athenians had done well in the early fighting and had succeeded in investing the city.  
Desperate, the Syracusans appealed to Sparta, which refused to send any troops, only a 
military adviser. This situation was far more grim than any faced by Athens until the very 
end of the Peloponnesian War. 	  
In response, the Syracusans made important governmental changes. They reduced 
the number of generals to three, and allowed the military adviser, Gylippus, who had no 
troops of his own, to act as commander-in-chief. The Assembly took a lower profile, 
giving Gylippus financial and material support, on the one hand, and tactical autonomy, 
on the other. Gylippus became the “the independent commander, with full powers,” that 
the Athenians authorized Alcibiades and Nicias to be. The Syracusan assembly 
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established a kind of balance of power between itself and its armed forces. The Assembly 
set the goal – raising the siege. Gylippus, seconded by the three Syracusan generals, 
decided how to reach this goal.   When asked for supplies, the Assembly provided them 
promptly, without the delays plaguing the Athenians.56 For his part, Gylippus mediated 
between the Assembly and its local allies, and between the Assembly and Sparta.57	  
To contrast Gylippus with the Athenians, he performed well because he had 
significantly more influence than Lamachus, was not under indictment, like Alcibiades, 
and did not lack resources, like Nicias. Furthermore, Gylippus was invested with 
autonomy by Sparta, and was deferred to by the Syracusan forces. 	  
The speech of Hermocrates to the Syracusans touches on several themes 
developed so far, and deserves to be quoted at some length. In many respects, Thucydides 
is speaking, not Hermocrates. The Athenians have just defeated the Syracusans in a battle 
outside the city:	  
[The Syracusans] had not been beaten so much as might have been expected, 
especially as they were, one might say, novices in the art of war, an army of 
artisans opposed to the  most experienced soldiers in Hellas. What had also done 
great harm was the number of generals (there were 15 of them) and the quantity 
of orders given, combined with the disorder and insubordination of the troops. But 
if they were to have a few skillful generals, and used this winter in preparing their 
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hoplites,…they would have every chance of beating their adversaries, courage 
already being theirs…..58	  
These remarks lay out the interrelated themes of professionalism, autonomy, unity of 
command. Next come the reforms advocated by Hermocrates:	  
The generals should be few and elected with full powers, and an oath should be 
taken to leave them entire discretion in their command: if they adopted this plan, 
their secrets would be better kept, all preparations would be properly made, and 
there would be no room for excuses.59	  
Now comes the decisive moment. A leader has proposed to the Assembly that it give up 
some of its own power, and proposed, besides, that most of the generals be dismissed. 
Will the Assembly agree?	  
The Syracusans heard him, voting everything as he advised, and elected three 
generals, Hermocrates himself, Heraclides son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus son of 
Execestes.60	  
One task remained, asking the Spartans for a commander, and then accepting the 
commander when he arrived. Thucydides does not say that the Syracusans made this 
request, but he does say that they asked for help, and that the Spartans decided to send 
them Gylippus. Once Gylippus arrives in Sicily, he assumes command immediately.61	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Thucydides 6.72.3-4.	  
	  
59 Thucydides 6.72.5.	  
	  
60 Thucydides 6.73.1.	  
	  
61 Thucydides 6.88.10; 7.2.1-4.	  
	  




	   	   	  
	  
 Thucydides also uses another commander as his mouthpiece. This – ironically—is 
Alcibiades. He explains to the Spartans why a Spartan must command the Syracusans:	  
…speedily do as I tell you, and send on board ships to Syracuse troops that shall 
be able to row their ships themselves, and serve as hoplites the moment they land, 
and what I consider even more important than the troops, a Spartiate as 
commanding officer to discipline the forces on foot…The friends that you already 
have will thus become more confident, and the waverers will be encouraged to 
join you.62	  
If Gylippus was a µόθαξ, the Spartans ignored this advice about the ethnic identity of the 
commander to be sent. Perhaps Gylippus’ influence meant that his pedigree was 
irrelevant.63 	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Thucydides 6.91.4.	  
	  
63 MacDowell (1986) 46-51 provides background on the status of µόθακες in Spartan society. 	  
	  




	   	   	  
	  
	  
Chapter Four: Analysis	  
Consequences of Athenian and Spartan political systems	  
Because the Athenian armed forces were effectively administered by a board of 
στρατηγοί elected yearly by the Athenian assembly, the ability to maintain continuous 
command and strategy day-to-day, or year-to-year, was impaired. The consequences were 
not as severe as they would have been had Athenian generals, like some other 
magistrates, been chosen by lot. Instead they were elected, and could be reelected. Both 
of these factors mitigated the drawbacks of the system. Nicias was a very experienced 
general, and Alcibiades and Demosthenes were also proven commanders. 	  
 More important were other weaknesses. The generals had to fear legal and quasi-
legal attacks on their authority. These attacks would not come from a system of military 
justice, but from civilian courts. Next, they had to fear the interference of the 
Assembly.64Any democratic government must supervise its commanders closely, to 
prevent treason or dissention, but in Athens the task of supervision was not given to 
magistrates who would be competent in this particular task. In Sicily, this unwelcome 
supervision was far away, but it still led to the appointment of too many generals. 	  
 In contrast, the systematic training for war in Spartan culture meant that the 
Assembly, like the officers and magistrates, would have had a realistic view of war. That 
view would influence how they administered armies and treated generals. One might 
suppose that Spartan toughness – for example, it was considered shameful to return home 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Roberts (1982) 177-178 agrees with the argument that Athens minimized the effectiveness of its armed 
forces through the excessive control it exerted over its military personnel, but does not attribute this to 
impeachment trials.	  
	  




	   	   	  
	  
alive from a battle in which the Spartans were defeated – would lead to 
micromanagement and harshness towards commanders, yet the opposite was true. The 
Spartans were less inclined to punish their leaders than the Athenians were. Gylippus, 
unlike his Athenian counterparts, was not burdened by politically appointed colleagues.	  
 Gylippus, to be sure, is used by Thucydides as a model commander, just as 
Brasidas was. (Thucydides does not report that Gylippus was eventually tried for taking 
bribes.65).  Yet he had a chance to serve as a model. Alcibiades did not.  	  
Furthermore, Sparta’s military force was mainly on land rather than at sea. That 
made it easier to concentrate and control. In the Spartan leaders, there was no element of 
the privateer or pirate, even if the leader was a good admiral, like Lysander. In the figure 
of Alcibiades, and in some others, like Themistocles, there was some element of the 
privateer or free-lance, if not the pirate. Even Pericles was launcher of raids. He preferred 
them to major battles. His opposite number, King Archidamus, sought a major land battle 
against the Athenians every spring for a number of years. All this made Athenian 
commanders harder to trust, and gave the Assembly a reason, or an excuse, to monitor 
them.  	  
Finally, Sparta’s alliances differed from those of Athens. Sparta relied very 
largely on allies, the exception being subject populations in Laconia and Messenia.66 This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 After serving under Lysander in 405, Gylippus embezzled 300 talents from the Athenian state’s war 
booty, and subsequently went into exile. (Plutarch, Life of Lysander 16). It is also interesting to note that 
Cleandridas, Gylippus’ father, exiled himself to Magna Graecia in 446 to avoid prosecution for allegedly 
accepting bribes from Pericles – thus leaving Gylippus with a sense of the consequences of financial 
misdeeds – and yet this did not prevent Gylippus from engaging in similar behavior. (cf. Plutarch, Life of 
Alcibiades 22.)	  
	  




	   	   	  
	  
reliance on allies and neighbors tended to keep the Spartans from embarking on long-
range adventures. Although Athens technically had “allies,” the Delian League was less 
of an alliance than an empire, and so it was easier for Athens to mount long-range 
expeditions to places like Sicily or Egypt. 	  
Another difference is symbolic. In Spartan warfare, the highest-ranked leaders – 
such as the kings – would go into battle, whereas many Athenian leaders remained in the 
city. So, even if one of the kings, plus the γερουσία and assembly remained in Sparta, the 
army in the field was the symbolic center of the community and the alliance. In Athens, 
the symbolic center was perhaps the Agora, home of the assembly, the Council of Five 
Hundred, the law courts, and other governmental bodies. Perhaps the symbolic center 
went with the Athenian fleet into the waters off Salamis in 480 BCE, but that was 
exceptional. The soul of Sparta marched out of the community and into battle many 
times.  	  
 All these differences would affect the Sicilian Expedition. The Athenian 
Assembly micromanaged, Nicias was timid, and the Athenian decision-makers were far 
away. Spartan policy was realistic, Gylippus was trustworthy (at least on the battlefield), 
and the Spartan alliance worked well. The remaining issue is how these differences 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Lendon (1994) provides a helpful analysis of the terms with which Sparta administered its alliance – 
calling for majority votes prior to military action. For examples of the “majority-vote covenant,” cf. 
Thucydides 5.30-31. 	  




	   	   	  
	  
Conclusion: Alcibiades and Athens	  
I have suggested that Alcibiades was justified in defecting to Sparta, where he 
would not be prosecuted, and where he could repudiate the practices and policies that had 
failed him and failed Athens. I would now like to make this point in a general way: 
Alcibiades flourished more in a system that allowed him the freedom to use his 
extraordinary talents than he did in a bureaucratic system where the citizen body 
interfered with both strategy and tactics. This feature of Alcibiades explains why he left 
Athens for Sparta, but also why, when circumstances changed, and the Assembly was 
willing to give more freedom of action, he returned.67 He was not so much disloyal to 
Athens, or attracted to Sparta, as interested in pursuing his own military career. His 
perspective was that of a traveling professional, a soldier of fortune. He was not, 
however, interested in money, as Gylippus proved to be. He sought glory, κλέος. He was 
pursuing a Homeric goal in a very un-Homeric military situation, in which military 
heroes depended on city-states for their advancement. 	  
As an Athenian exile, Thucydides may have felt some sympathy for Alcibiades, 
also an exile. However, his case against Athens’ military mismanagement does not 
depend on Alcibiades. It is a general case, illustrated by earlier episodes in the 
Peloponnesian War. Thucydides did not approve of the Athenian Assembly’s tendency to 
make decisions based on impulse or ignorance. He preferred a system administered by 
skilled men with long-term military experience – men not subject to the whims of a 
crowd, or to punishment by fickle courts.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 See Plutarch, Life of Lysander 3 et seq. for a narrative of Athenian military exploits after the return of 
Alcibiades to Athens.	  




	   	   	  
	  
 Plutarch agrees with this critique of the Assembly.  He confirms his view by his 
handling of the Roman assemblies in the life paired with that of Alcibiades, Coriolanus. 
Here Plutarch repeatedly demonstrates the negative effects of government and popular 
influence in military administration. Like Alcibiades, Coriolanus is consequently exiled, 
then recalled. Like Alcibiades, he is tacitly justified for seeking refuge with a hostile 
foreign power.	  
 Although the Athenian state sent the trireme Salaminia to bring Alcibiades back 
to Athens for trial, Alcibiades perhaps could have rallied his troops to mutiny against the 
Athenian state in his favor. However, the necessity of relying upon Athens for materiel 
and troops would have rendered such a response useless. As Jennifer Roberts argues, “the 
Athenians were unquestionably very exacting towards their political and military leaders; 
no fear of appearing weak or disunited to the world outside inhibited them from 
exercising their right to discipline officials with whom they were dissatisfied.”68  
 In my view, the Athenians were overly exacting—as emerges from Thucydides, 
in spite of his biases, his imperfect information, and his ambiguous attitude towards 
Alcibiades, who was a victim of the Athenians’ weaknesses.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Roberts (1982) 181. 




	   	   	  
	  
	  
Appendix: Chronology of the Sicilian Expedition69	  
Winter of 416/5 BCE  Athens votes to send a fleet to Sicily	  
Summer of 415 BCE Debate in Athenian assembly regarding Sicily, including 
speeches by Alcibiades and Nicias	  
	  
 Debate in Syracusan assembly, including speeches by 
Hermocrates, Athenagoras, and a Syracusan general	  
	  
 Athenian discovery of Egestaean fraud and poverty	  
	  
 Mutilation of the herms	  
	  
 Political attacks on Alcibiades	  
	  
 The Athenian expedition sets sail for Sicily	  
	  
 Alcibiades is recalled from Sicily to face trial, and 
subsequently escapes at Thurii	  
	  
Winter of 415/4 BCE Syracuse requests help from Corinth and Sparta	  
 	  
 Athens votes to send financial resources and 
reinforcements to Sicily	  
	  
Summer of 414 BCE Athenians sail to Syracuse	  
	  
 Gylippus marches from Himera to Syracuse, and is 
successful in saving Syracuse	  
	  
Winter of 414/3 BCE Gylippus persuades the Syracusans to build and train a fleet	  
	  
Summer of 413 BCE Athenian reinforcements arrive	  
	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Reproduced from information in Strassler (1996) 556-575.	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